

No. 01-25

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2001

ALFRED TRENKLER,
PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES,
RESPONDENT

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No.

In The Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 2001

Alfred Trenkler,
Petitioner

v.

United States,
Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served three (3) copies of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by depositing them with the United States Postal Service on July 3, 2001, with first class postage affixed thereto, addressed to:

Solicitor General of the United States
Room 5614
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20530-0001.



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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the lower court erred when it held that the doctrine of unique circumstances is available only when incorrect information about the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is conveyed by the district judge herself, rather than by the district court's clerk.

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Alfred Trenkler hereby petitions for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to review a final judgment in a criminal case.

ORDER BY THE COURT BELOW

On April 6, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered judgment dismissing Mr. Trenkler's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A-1. The court's order stated:

This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We have held in United States v. Heller, 957 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1992), that "reliance on the advice, statements, or actions of court employees cannot trigger the [unique circumstances] doctrine, whether appellant is or is not pro se." Heller is not an old case, and counsel does not point to any radical shift in the case law of other circuits, or of the Supreme Court, which would lead a panel of this court to depart from earlier circuit precedent. Accordingly, we adhere to our view expressed in Heller.

BASIS OF JURISDICTION

The court of appeal issued its judgment on April 6, 2001. A-1. The ninetieth day falls on July 5, 2001. Thus, the petition is timely filed if mailed on July 5, 2001. This Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments of the courts of appeals in criminal cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner Alfred Trenkler was indicted on December 16, 1992, and charged with conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371, receipt of explosive material, 18 U.S.C. § 844(d), and attempted malicious destruction of property by means of explosives, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). On November 29, 1993, a jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. A-5. The district court sentenced Mr. Trenkler to life in prison. Judgment entered on March 10, 1994. A divided court of appeals affirmed the convictions. *United States v. Trenkler*, 61 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 1995).

On August 10, 2000, Mr. Trenkler filed a Motion for a New Trial. A-8. The motion asserted that the Trenkler's counsel had recently unearthed important new evidence establishing that Mr. Trenkler was entitled to a new trial. Specifically, petitioner averred that evidence had been uncovered that a receipt for a switch at Radio Shack for an item that was supposedly used to construct a bomb had been fabricated. In addition, the petitioner averred that the petitioner's co-defendant, one Thomas Shay, had recently told petitioner's counsel that Mr. Trenkler was not involved in the bombing. Finally, petitioner averred that a witness had been discovered who undermined the testimony of a jailhouse informant who testified against petitioner at trial.

On December 28, 2000, the district court, Zobel, J., denied the new trial motion. A-5. Judge Zobel held that the new trial motion was untimely because, under the pre-1999 version of Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, the two year period for filing a new trial motion, running from the date of final judgment, had expired, and under the 1999 version of Rule 33, the motion was filed more than three years after the verdict. The district judge also

RULES INVOLVED IN THE CASE

Rule 4(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

(b) Appeal in a Criminal Case.

(1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal.

- (A) In a criminal case, a defendant's notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 10 days after the later of:
- (i) the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed; or,
 - (ii) the filing of the government's notice of appeal.

Rule 4(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

- (4) Motion for Extension of Time. Upon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may – before or after the time has expired, with or without motion and notice – extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(b).

rejected the motion on its merits, finding that the latter two grounds were unsupported by affidavit, while the first ground was available at the time of trial.

The defendant was shortly thereafter notified that his attorney, Morris M. Goldings, had become disabled and retired from the firm. A-23, 27. Mr. Goldings was a prominent criminal defense attorney in Boston, and it was widely reported that he was suspected of having stolen millions of dollars from his clients. The defendant was advised that he would be represented by Bruce Edmands, who had practiced law with Mr. Goldings. On January 2, 2001, Mr. Edmands told Jack Wallace, the defendant's step-father, that he would protect the defendant's right to appeal the denial of the new trial motion. Mr. Edmands also expressed his desire to meet with Mr. Wallace, but stated that he was unable to do so because he was busy with the chaos resulting from Mr. Goldings' departure.

On January 5, 2001, Mr. Edmands sought a thirty day extension of time in which to file the notice of appeal from the denial of the new trial motion. A-14. On January 8, 2001, Mr. Edmands filed a brief for Mr. Trenkler in an appeal from the denial of a federal habeas petition. *Trenkler v. United States*, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit No. 00-1657. A-24. That appeal is still pending.

On January 22, 2001, Judge Zobel allowed the motion to enlarge the time for filing the notice of appeal by thirty days. A-15. Mr. Edmands sent a copy of the allowed motion to Mr. Wallace, and told Mr. Wallace that he should seek other counsel for his step-son. On January 29, 2001, Mary Cummings, Courtroom Supervisor of the district court, told Mr. Wallace that the time for filing the notice of appeal would begin running when the allowance of the motion was docketed,

and said that the allowance had not been docketed. On February 2, 2001, Lisa Urso, Judge Zobel's deputy clerk, told Mr. Wallace that the allowed motion had been docketed on February 1, and that the notice of appeal was due no later than 30 days after February 1. Has he been told that the notice of appeal was due on February 6, Mr. Wallace would have hired an attorney by that date to file the notice of appeal. Mr. Wallace is not an attorney, and he has no legal training. Over the years, he had tried to assist his step-son by retaining and communicating with his attorneys. A-22-25.

New counsel was retained on February 11, 2001, A-25, and the Notice of Appeal was filed on February 20, 2001. A-16.

On March 14, 2001, the court of appeals questioned whether it had jurisdiction, and invited a response from Mr. Trenkler. A-3. That response was filed on March 28, 2001. A-17. In the response, petitioner sought refuge in the doctrine of unique circumstances. *Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 375 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1964) (per curiam); *Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney*, 489 U.S. 169 (1989). Petitioner noted that there is a split in the circuits over whether the doctrine applies in circumstances where the erroneous advice was given by personnel from the clerk's office, as opposed to the district judge herself. *Compare Willis v. Newsome*, 747 F.2d 605 (11th Cir. 1984), and *Hollins v. Department of Corrections*, 191 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the doctrine may be triggered by errors committed by clerk's office), with *United States v. Heller*, 957 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that the erroneous advice must be rendered by the district judge herself).

The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on April 6, 2001,

finding that the Notice of Appeal was untimely. A-1.

REASONS FOR GRANTING PETITION

This Court Should Resolve the Circuit Split Between the First and Eleventh Circuits by Deciding That the Doctrine of Unique Circumstances Is Not Limited to Occasions When Erroneous Statements by a District Judge Lead to the Late-filing of a Notice of Appeal, but Can Also Be Triggered by Erroneous Advice Rendered to Pro Se Litigants by Clerk's Office Personnel.

The deadline for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. It is, however, subject to the doctrine of unique circumstances. In *Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 375 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1964) (per curiam), the Court permitted a litigant to pursue post-trial motions that had been served in an admittedly untimely manner, thereby defeating jurisdiction. The Court held that the litigant's reliance on the District Court's explicit statements that the motions were timely, and the fact that the litigant could have cured the problem had a question been raised, were "unique circumstances" that warranted relief.

In *Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney*, 489 U.S. 169 (1989), the Court again addressed the doctrine. While declining to apply the *Thompson* doctrine, the Court reiterated its vitality:

By its terms, *Thompson* applies only where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.

489 U.S. at 179.

In *United States v. Heller*, 957 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1992), the First Circuit recognized that there is a split among the courts of appeals as to whether the misleading statement must be made by a judge, or whether it could also be made by a person from the clerk's office. The court held that the misstatement must be made by a judge.

The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, applies the doctrine to statements by clerk's office personnel. *Willis v. Newsome*, 747 F.2d 605 (11th Cir. 1984); *Hollins v. Department of Corrections*, 191 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999). The First Circuit gives the *Thompson* doctrine a narrow reading, while the Eleventh Circuit gives it a liberal reading. *Cf. Heller*, 957 F.2d at 31, with *Hollins*, 191 F.3d at 1327. *See also Schwartz v. Pridy*, 94 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying doctrine of unique circumstances when clerk's office mistakenly returned a notice of appeal because one had prematurely been filed); *Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Fitch*, 966 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying doctrine where clerk's office sent incorrectly dated notice that was relied upon by litigants)

The Court should use this case as a vehicle for reexamining its attitude towards this doctrine. Specifically, the Court should decide whether erroneous advice by clerk's office personnel to a pro se litigant can trigger the doctrine of unique circumstances. This is an equitable doctrine, designed to ameliorate the unfairness that can arise when incorrect advice is given to a litigant by judicial personnel. It is particularly appropriate to apply the doctrine where the court system is dealing with a pro se litigant, because pro se litigants often rely upon information they glean from court personnel, and they are

often unable to discover that they have been given incorrect advice.

The prevalence of pro se litigants has increased in recent years as the costs of litigation spiral upwards. While calculating the effect of a post-trial motion on the deadline for filing a notice of appeal may seem like a simple matter for an attorney or a judicial officer, a pro se litigant often runs afoul of the applicable rules. In these circumstances, where a pro se litigant detrimentally relies upon the advice of a judicial officer, it is appropriate and fair to excuse that litigant's misunderstandings.

This case is a vivid demonstration of the need for equity to ease the harsh result that would otherwise obtain. Mr. Wallace was advised by two high-level officials of the clerk's office that the time for filing the notice of appeal would begin to run once the judge's allowance of the motion to enlarge had been docketed. That advice appeared to come from the judge herself. Indeed, one of the officials was the district judge's courtroom clerk. To the public, and to pro se litigants, such high-ranking personnel of the clerk's office speak with the apparent imprimatur of the court itself.

Here there are important equitable factors favoring relief. The defendant was left in the lurch created by his lawyer's disability. His step-father, Jack Wallace, set out to retain new counsel for the defendant, who is incarcerated. Mr. Wallace was assured by two ranking members of the district court's clerk's office – the Courtroom Supervisor and Judge Zobel's courtroom deputy – that the time for filing a notice of appeal would expire thirty days after the docketing of the judge's order allowing an extra thirty days to file the notice of appeal. Reliance on that advice was reasonable, and indeed it appeared

to come directly from the judge herself. Moreover, it was given at a time when it would have been possible to file a timely notice of appeal if proper advice had been given. Mr. Wallace was told by clerk's office personnel on January 30 and February 2 that he had at least until the end of February. Under the law, the time to appeal expired on February 6, 2001. In these circumstances, the doctrine of unique circumstances should be applied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Respectfully submitted
The petitioner Alfred Trenkler
By his attorneys



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APPENDIX A

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 01-1323

UNITED STATES,
Appellee,

v.

ALFRED W. TRENKLER,
Defendant, Appellant.

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

JUDGMENT

Entered: April 6, 2001

This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We have held in United States v. Heller, 957 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1992), that “reliance on the advice, statements, or actions of court employees cannot trigger the [unique circumstances] doctrine,

whether appellant is or is not pro se.” Heller is not an old case, and counsel does not point to any radical shift in the case law of other circuits, or of the Supreme Court, which would lead a panel of this court to depart from earlier circuit precedent. Accordingly, we adhere to our view expressed in Heller.

By the Court:

PHOEBE MORSE
Clerk.

[Cert Copy to Judge Harrington and Tony Anastas, Clerk,
DCMA]

cc: Messrs. Goldings, Sultan, Rankin, McGrath and
Chaitowitz]

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CRIMINAL NO. 92-10369-RWZ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

v.

ALFRED W. TRENKLER
Defendant

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

December 28, 2000

ZOBEL, D.J.

Defendant, Alfred W. Trenkler, was convicted by a jury on November 29, 1993 of conspiracy and two substantive "explosives" counts under 18 U.S.C. § 844. Judgment entered on March 8, 1994 and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on July 18, 1995. The matter is before me on defendant's Motion for a New Trial or, in the Alternative, for an

Evidentiary Hearing, the fourth attack on the judgment.¹ Defendant again cites evidence he alleges is newly discovered. He asserts that records of Radio Shack show that the government fabricated a receipt from its store on Massachusetts Avenue in Boston for the sale to Thomas Shay of components of the bomb; that Mr. Shay, the co-defendant, would testify that Mr. Trenkler did not commit the offense of which he stands convicted; and that another witness, John J. Bowden, would offer testimony concerning the veracity of a trial witness, David Lindholm.

The motion for a new trial fails on the merits and an evidentiary hearing would not cure its essential weakness. Apart from the fact that the records of Tandy Corporation, the parent of Radio Shack, show the purchase defendant contests,

¹ On December 22, 1995, defendant filed the first motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 on the ground of newly discovered evidence; namely, the testimony of a Dr. Robert Phillips, a psychiatrist who opined on the credibility of Thomas Shay, the co-defendant, and an alleged agreement for leniency of a government witness, David Lindholm.

In November 1996, defendant moved for a Judicial Inquiry into Possible Juror Misconduct and for a New Trial.

On January 5, 1999, defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the judgment on the ground of ineffective assistance of his retained trial counsel because of counsel's failure to call Dr. Phillips.

All three motions were denied and the denial of the first two, affirmed on appeal. The third is still pending.

the evidence he cites was available at the time of the trial. The allegedly exculpatory statements of Thomas Shay and John Bowden are unsupported by any affidavits and, in the case of Mr. Shay, directly contradict his sworn testimony at his change of plea hearing.

In the end, however, the motion fails because it is simply too late. Current Rule 33, as amended in 1999, provides that “[a] motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made only within three years after the verdict or finding of guilty.” Former Rule 33 granted a two-year period for filing a motion for a new trial and the time ran from the date of final judgment. Whichever version of the Rule governs, the motion, filed in August 2000, is untimely as it was filed more than three years after the verdict, November 1993, and more than two years after the date of the mandate from the Court of Appeals, July 1995.

The motion for a new trial is denied.

December 28, 20000 /s/
DATE RYA W. ZOBEL
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CRIMINAL NO. 92-10369-Z

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ALFRED W. TRENKLER,
Defendant

**DEFENDANT ALFRED W. TRENKLER’S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL,
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING**

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, the Defendant Alfred W. Trenkler [“Trenkler”], who is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment, hereby moves this Court to set aside the verdict returned in the above-entitled action on November 29, 1993 (and the judgment entered thereon on March 8, 1994) and to grant a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. In the alternative, the defendant requests an evidentiary hearing relating to certain newly discovered evidence. As reasons therefor, the Defendant asserts the following:

(1) In late October and November 1993, Trenkler was tried

by a jury for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, receipt of explosive material under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d), and attempted malicious destruction of property by means of explosive under 18 U.S.C. § 844(I) arising out of an explosion in Roslindale, Massachusetts, on October 28, 1991, which killed a Boston Police officer and seriously injured a second Boston Police officer. Trenkler was convicted on November 29, 1993, and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for life on the counts of receipt of explosive materials and attempted malicious destruction of property by means of explosives and for sixty months on the count of conspiracy by a judgment of conviction entered on March 8, 1994.

- (2) The hallmark question in the case against Trenkler was the identity of the creator of the Roslindale bomb. Trial Transcript, pp. 162, 229. There was no direct physical evidence linking Trenkler to the 1991 bomb. Trial Transcript, pp. 910, 944-945.
- (3) As a result of the appeal of Trenkler's conviction, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Alfred W. Trenkler, No. 94-1301, found that this Court erred in admitting certain computer-derived evidence under the residual exception to the hearsay rule to prove the identity of the creator of the Roslindale bomb, but nonetheless found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of a government witness David Lindholm was crucial to upholding the conviction. There was a strong and lengthy dissent by Chief Judge Torruella.
- (4) The Defendant was not aware at the time of the trial of

this action in October and November 1993, of the following newly discovered evidence:

- (1) At the trial of this case, the United States introduced into evidence a certain receipt and other evidence concerning the alleged purchase at a Radio Shack facility in Boston Massachusetts of a certain item by the Defendant, Alfred W. Trenkler.
- (2) Inquiry made on behalf of the Defendant with the Radio Shack corporation has demonstrated that the receipt was fabricated and did not correspond to the testimony offered by the United States on this subject.
- (3) That testimony was critical to the prosecution of this case and without it, it is likely that the jury would not have reached a verdict against the Defendant, Alfred W. Trenkler.
- (4) An interview with Thomas A. Shay, who was indicted with the Defendant, Alfred W. Trenkler, and was tried separately and before Alfred W. Trenkler by Morris M. Goldings, Esquire at Shay's place of incarceration at the McKeen County Correctional Facility in Bradford, Pennsylvania has resulted in statements by Shay that the testimony by the Radio Shack employee concerning the purchaser of the items was false and biased. The interview also yielded a statement by Thomas A. Shay that Alfred W. Trenkler did not commit the crimes for which he has been convicted.
- (5) Thomas A. Shay has on previous occasions stated

to other persons known to the United States that Alfred W. Trenkler did not commit the crimes for which he has been convicted.

- (6) An additional witness concerning the veracity of the testimony of David Lindholm has come forward and has offered to testify as to that crucial guilt witness. His name is John J. Bowden and he is presently incarcerated in Allenwood Federal Correctional Institute.
- (7) A hearing is necessary in order to produce the evidence demonstrating the falsity of the Radio Shack evidence and the exculpatory testimony of Thomas A. Shay, and further evidence concerning the veracity of the witness Lindholm and consequently, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum is filed herewith with respect to Thomas A. Shay and a similar Petition for a Writ is filed herewith with respect to John J. Bowden.
- (8) An affidavit of Robert W. Blair, Associate General Counsel – Litigation for Tandy Corporation, which owns and operates over 5,000 Radio Shack stores throughout the United States, states:
 - (1) I am Associate General Counsel – Litigation for Tandy Corporation which owns and operates over 5,000 Radio Shack stores throughout the United States.
 - (2) I have cause [sic] to be made a search for and examination of certain business records of the Radio Shack Division, specifically the general

journal printout for Radio Shack store No. 01-1021 located at 197 Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts for the date of October 18, 1991.

- (3) I have also examined sales receipt No. 098973 a copy of which is attached to this Affidavit.
- (4) Based upon my examination of these documents and my knowledge of the business practices of Radio Shack stores, other than the store address and number, none of the information on sales receipt No. 098973 matches any information contained in Radio Shack's general journal for store No. 01-1021 on October 18, 1991.

(A copy of Attorney Blair's Affidavit and the sales receipt attached thereto are attached hereto and marked Attachment "A.")

WHEREFORE, the Defendant Alfred W. Trenkler respectfully requests that this Court grant his Motion for a New Trial or, in the Alternative, for an Evidentiary Hearing.

CERTIFICATION UNDER LOCAL RULE 7.1(A)(2)

The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel for the Defendant has attempted in good faith to resolve the issues surrounding this motion with counsel for the government.

Dated: 8/10/00 _____ /s/
Morris M. Goldings

The request for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal in the above-captioned case is requested so that the defendant can decide whether this firm or other counsel will represent him.

Filed January 5, 2001

Allowed Rya W. Zobel 1/22/01

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CRIMINAL #92-10369-RWZ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALFRED W. TRENKLER

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Alfred W. Trenkler, defendant in the above-captioned criminal case, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit from the decision of this Court dated December 28, 2000 denying his motion for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,
ALFRED W. TRENKLER
By his attorneys,

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February 20, 2001

APPENDIX G

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 01-1323

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee

v.

ALFRED W. TRENKLER,
Defendant/Appellant

**MEMORANDUM REGARDING COURT'S ORDER
OF MARCH 14, 2001 REGARDING
TIMELINESS OF APPEAL**

The defendant/appellant Alfred W. Trenkler submits this Memorandum in response to the Court's March 14, 2001 Order regarding whether the notice of appeal was timely filed. The defendant-appellant is submitting herewith the Affidavit of Jack Wallace. In this Memorandum, the defendant contends that the Court should permit the appeal to go forward because of the doctrine of "unique circumstances."

The district court denied the defendant's new trial motion on December 28, 2000. The defendant was shortly thereafter notified that his attorney, Morris M. Goldings, had become disabled and retired from the firm. The defendant was advised

that he will be represented by Bruce Edmands. On January 2, 2001, Mr. Edmands told Jack Wallace, the defendant's step-father, that he would protect the defendant's right to appeal the denial of the new trial motion. Mr. Edmands also expressed his desire to meet with Mr. Wallace, but stated that he was unable to do so because he was busy with the chaos resulting from Mr. Goldings' departure. On January 5, 2001, Mr. Edmands sought a thirty day extension of time in which to file the notice of appeal from the denial of the new trial motion. On January 8, 2001, Mr. Edmands filed a brief for Mr. Trenkler in an appeal from the denial of a federal habeas petition. *Trenkler v. United States*, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit No. 00-1657.

On January 22, 2001, Judge Zobel allowed the motion to enlarge the time for filing the notice of appeal by thirty days. Mr. Edmands sent a copy of the allowed motion to Mr. Wallace, and told Mr. Wallace that he should seek other counsel for his step-son. On January 29, 2001, Mary Cummings, Courtroom Supervisor of the district court, told Mr. Wallace that the time for filing the notice of appeal would begin running when the allowance of the motion was docketed, and said that the allowance had not been docketed. On February 2, 2001, Lisa Urso, Judge Zobel's deputy clerk, told Mr. Wallace that the allowed motion had been docketed on February 1, and that the notice of appeal was due no later than 30 days after February 1. Has he been told that the notice of appeal was due on February 6, Mr. Wallace would have hired an attorney by that date to file the notice of appeal.

Mr. Wallace hired new counsel on February 11, 2001, and new counsel filed a notice of appeal on February 20, 2001.

(a) The Court Should Permit the Appeal to Go Forward Because of the Doctrine of Unique Circumstances.

The deadline for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. It is, however, subject to the doctrine of unique circumstances. In *Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 375 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1964) (per curiam), the Supreme Court permitted a litigant to pursue post-trial motions that had been served in an admittedly untimely manner, thereby defeating jurisdiction. The Court held that the litigant's reliance on the District Court's explicit statements that the motions were timely, and the fact that the litigant could have cured the problem had a question been raised, were "unique circumstances" that warranted relief.

In *Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney*, 489 U.S. 169 (1989), the Court again addressed the doctrine. While declining to apply the *Thompson* doctrine, the Court reiterated its vitality:

By its terms, *Thompson* applies only where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.

489 U.S. at 179.

In *United States v. Heller*, 957 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1992), recognized the continuing viability of the doctrine. It explained that the appellate court is the proper forum to determine whether to apply the doctrine, although it recognized that it might be appropriate to remand the matter to the trial court for fact findings. 957 F.2d at 28.

The Court recognized that there is a split among the courts of appeals as to whether the misleading statement must be made by a judge, or whether it could also be made by a person from the clerk's office. The Court held that the misstatement must be made by a judge. The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, applies the doctrine even to statements by clerk's office personnel. *Willis v. Newsome*, 747 F.2d 605 (11th Cir. 1984); *Hollins v. Department of Corrections*, 191 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999). This Circuit gives the *Thompson* doctrine a narrow reading, while the Eleventh Circuit gives it a liberal reading. *Cf. Heller*, 957 F.2d at 31, with *Hollins*, 191 F.3d at 1327.

The Court should use this case as a vehicle for reexamining its attitude towards this doctrine. Here there are important equitable factors favoring relief. The defendant was left in the lurch created by his lawyer's disability. His step-father set out to retain new counsel for the defendant, who is incarcerated. Mr. Wallace was assured by two ranking members of the district court's clerk's office – the Courtroom Supervisor and Judge Zobel's courtroom deputy – that the time for filing a notice of appeal would expire thirty days after the docketing of the judge's order allowing an extra thirty days to file the notice of appeal. Reliance on that advice was reasonable, and indeed it appeared to come directly from the judge herself. Moreover, it was given at a time when it would have been possible to file a timely notice of appeal if proper advice had been given. Under the law the time to appeal expired on February 6, 2001. Mr. Wallace was told by clerk's office personnel on January 30 and February 2 that he had at least until the end of February. In these circumstances, the doctrine of unique circumstances should be applied. In the alternative, the Court should remand the matter for fact-finding by Judge Zobel.

Respectfully submitted
The defendant/appellant Alfred Trenkler
By his attorneys

_____/s/
Charles W. Rankin, BBO No. 411780
James L. Sultan
Rankin & Sultan
1 Commercial Wharf North
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 720-0011

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the foregoing by delivering a copy to AUSA Dina M. Chaitowitz on March 28, 2001

_____/s/
Charles W. Rankin

APPENDIX H

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT**

No. 01-1323

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee

v.

ALFRED W. TRENKLER,
Defendant/Appellant

AFFIDAVIT OF JACK WALLACE

Jack Wallace, being duly sworn according to law, hereby deposes and says as follows:

1. My name is Jack Wallace. I am the stepfather of defendant/appellant Alfred W. Trenkler. I am not an attorney and I do not have legal training. My stepson is incarcerated at USP-Allenwood, where he is serving a life sentence. In the years since his conviction, I have tried to assist him by helping him obtain counsel and by staying in regular communication with his attorneys.
2. Attorney Morris M. Goldings had represented my son on his direct appeal and on various post-conviction matters for

many years. Mr. Goldings had litigated a new trial motion that was filed in August 2000 before Judge Zobel. On Saturday, December 30, 2000, I learned that Judge Zobel had denied the new trial motion by reading an article in *The Boston Globe*. A copy of the article is attached as Exhibit 1.

3. At some point during the long holiday weekend between December 30, 2000 and January 1, 2001, I learned by talking on the telephone to my stepson that he had received a letter from James B. Cox, Managing Partner of Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings. A copy of that letter is attached hereto as *Exhibit A*. The letter informed my stepson that Mr. Goldings had become disabled and retired from the firm. The letter indicated that my stepson would hereafter be represented by Bruce Edmands of the Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings firm.
4. On January 2, 2001, I attempted to reach Morris Goldings. On that date, I was unable to speak with Mr. Goldings, but I did speak with Mr. Edmands. Mr. Edmands advised me that he would be handling Alfred's case. He wanted to meet with me, but would be unable to meet with me for at least another week because of the chaos in the firm created by Mr. Goldings' departure. He promised to send me a copy of the letter he had sent to my step-son, and he told me that he would file a motion with Judge Zobel to protect my step-son's rights regarding the new trial motion. I received a copy of the letter sent to my son on January 5, 2001.
5. On January 3, 2001, I called Lisa Urso, Deputy Clerk to Judge Zobel, to request a copy of the Memorandum of Decision because the Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings firm

had not received it. . She was kind enough to fax it to me.

- (f) The firm of Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings was also representing my son in an appeal from the denial of a federal *habeas* petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. *Alfred W. Trenkler v. United States*, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit No. 00-1657. Mr. Edmands and Mr. Jacobs from Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings filed a brief in that appeal on my stepson's behalf on January 8, 2001.
7. During the week of January 22, 2001, I spoke to Mr. Edmands. He was still unable to meet with me because he was busy with the problems created by Mr. Goldings' departure. He advised me that we should retain new counsel because there could be a conflict-of-interest if the Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings firm continued to represent my stepson.
- (8) On January 22, 2001, Judge Zobel allowed Mr. Edmands' motion for extension of time in which to file the notice of appeal. I learned of that decision a couple of days later when I received a copy of the endorsed motion from Mr. Edmands. To this day I have never met Mr. Edmands.
- (9) On January 29, 2001, I spoke with Mary Cummings, Courtroom Supervisor of the District Court Clerk's Office, to clarify when the 30-day extension of time began running. Ms. Cummings informed me that the 30 days to file a notice of appeal would commence when the order allowing the extension was docketed. She informed me that it had not yet been docketed.
- (10) On February 2, 2001, I spoke with Lisa Urso, Deputy Clerk to Judge Zobel. Ms. Urso told me that she had

December 29, 2000

Mr. Alfred W. Trenkler
#19377-038
USP Allenwood
PO Box 3000
White Deer, PA 17887

Dear Mr. Trenkler:

I write to inform you that our partner, Morris Goldings, has very recently become disabled. His condition prevents him from practicing law, and he has retired from the Firm. For that reason, we must advise you that Morris has no authority to act in any capacity on behalf of this law firm. We regret this news, and we wish Morris well.

We have arranged to have another partner of our firm experienced in this area, Bruce Winthrop Edmands, assume responsibility for each matter of yours that is now pending. That partner will be directly responsible for the matter unless you advise me that you prefer some other arrangement. Bruce Winthrop Edmands will be in touch with you very soon to discuss this transition.

I regret any inconvenience this unexpected announcement may cause you. I also wish to assure you that we are fully capable and desirous of continuing to represent your interests

effectively and immediately. We very much appreciate the opportunity to serve you and hope you will permit us to continue to do so.

Please feel free to telephone me with any concerns you may have, and please accept our best wishes for a healthy and prosperous New Year.

Very truly yours,

James B. Cox
Managing Partner

JBC/dmh:67479

EXHIBIT A